Today's Clown Council performance

With glassy eyes, the Quartzsite Town Council stared adoringly at Town Attorney Martin Brannan who said, "First is the investigation into voting irregularities. When I was hired as the Town Attorney I was provided with the obligation to perform the duties both that are prescribed by this council and by the Arizona Revised Statutes by the State Legislature. Those include ARS sections 16-924 and 16-1021 which deal with the imposition of civil and criminal penalties for violations of Title 16 which is the voting section of the voting Title of Arizona Revised Statutes. With regard to the hiring of investigators both by contract and by ordinance this council has promised that the Town Attorney will have the resources necessary to do the job that the council hired the Town Attorney to do. And that was the basis for hiring Mr. Humphrey."

To that sir, I respond "BULLSHIT"! 

And now, an analysis by a legal-minded friend:

16-1021. Enforcement by attorney general and county, city or town attorney

In any election for state office, members of the legislature, justices of the supreme court, judges of the court of appeals or statewide initiative or referendum the attorney general may enforce the provisions of this title through civil and criminal actions.

In any election for county, city or town office, community college district governing board, judge or a county, city or town initiative or referendum, the appropriate county, city or town attorney may enforce the provisions of this title through civil and criminal actions.

In any special district election, the county attorney of any county in which the district or a portion of the district is located or the attorney general may enforce the laws governing such election.

END STATUTE.

THIS MEANS THE TOWN ATTORNEY CANNOT ENFORCE TITLE 16-182, VOTER FRAUD STATUTES; which means the Town Attorney-Town Prosecutor can only INVESTIGATE, which means NO ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY in Federal Court from Title 18 voter intimidation lawsuits.>

VOTER FRAUD:

16-182. False registration; classification; cancellation of registration

A. A person who knowingly causes, procures or allows himself to be registered as an elector of any county, city, town, district or precinct, knowing that he is not entitled to such registration, or a person who knowingly causes or procures another person to be registered as an elector of any county, city, town, district or precinct, knowing that such other person is not entitled to such registration, or an officer who knowingly enters the name of any person not entitled to registration upon the register or roll of electors, is guilty of a class 6 felony.

B. If on the trial of a person charged with an offense under this section, it appears that the accused is registered as an elector of any county, city, town or precinct, without being qualified for such registration, the court shall order his registration canceled.

1) ONLY COUNTY ATTORNEY OR AG ARE APPROPRIATE  [statutorily empowered]ATTORNEYS TO ENFORCE Title 16-182 because it is a class 6 FELONY and Town Prosecutors cannot enforce laws [ like Voter registration fraud] that are felonies.

2)  Town Police have authority to investigate crimes upon a verified complaint, but they must forward a investigative report to the County Attorney.

Town Attorneys cannot enforce a Title 16-182.

Town Prosecutors cannot enforce Title 16-182.

ABSOLUTE VERSUS QUALIFIED IMMUNITY [All prosecutors have absolute immunity when prosecuting cases, even if they violated someone’s Constitutional rights. With one exception, acts they do as “INVESTIGATIVE ACTS”. If they violate people’s constitutional right sin an INVESTIGATIVE FUNCTION, the have only “qualified” immunity from personal liability.

Here’s what Brannan is claiming at today's council meeting:

First, is the investigation into voting irregularities. When I was hired as the Town Attorney I was provided with the obligation to perform the duties both that are prescribed by this council and by the Arizona Revised Statutes by the State Legislature. Those include ARS sections 16-924 and 16-1021 which deal with the imposition of civil and criminal penalties for violations of Title 16 which is the voting section of the voting Title of Arizona Revised Statutes.

With regard to the hiring of investigators both by contract and by ordinance this council has promised that the Town Attorney will have the resources necessary to do the job that the council hired the Town Attorney to do.

And that was the basis for hiring Mr. Humphrey. Mr. Humphrey was hired under Section 3-409 of the Quartzsite Revised Town Code formerly Section 3-4-8. he provides professional service an order Does not apply to his situation.

We are continuing in this investigation I intend to be meeting with the Attorney General in the next week or two weeks to ask him to take over the investigation because they have resources far beyond what we have.

If they refuse to do that of course the Town will do what’s necessary and I’ll do what’s necessary under the law to enforce these statutes.

We’d just be better served if the Attorney General.

US SUPREME COURT CASE:

Honorable Ronald V. DELLUMS, et al.,
v.
James M. POWELL, Chief, United States Capitol Police, and
John N. Mitchell, Department of Justice, Appellants,
Jerry V. Wilson, Chief, Metropolitan Police Department, et al.

No. 80-1331.

United States Court of Appeals,
District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued June 9, 1981.
Decided July 24, 1981.

https://law.resource.org/pub/reporter/F2/660/660.F2d.802.80-1331.html

It is of course well-recognized that the Attorney General is entitled to absolute immunity with respect to prosecutorial acts taken within the scope of his duties. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). However, as was noted in Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied sub nom Mitchell v. Forsyth, --- U.S. ---, 101 S.Ct. 3147, 69 L.Ed.2d 997 (1980).

Imbler v. Pachtman ... utilized a functional approach.

It suggested that even a prosecuting attorney would not be absolutely immune from suit for actions which are not closely connected with the judicial process.

The Supreme Court's holding was narrow:

"We hold only that in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State's case, the prosecutor is immune from a civil suit for damages under § 1983." 424 U.S. at 431, 96 S.Ct. at 995.

The Court emphasized that the prosecutor's activities "were intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process," and therefore, were "functions to which the reasons for absolute immunity apply with full force." Id. at 430, 96 S.Ct. at 995.

Id. at 1213.

Numerous other decisions, handed down both before and after the decision in Imbler, have distinguished between a prosecutor's "quasi-judicial functions on the one hand and his investigative and administrative functions on the other, granting absolute immunity to the former and relegating the latter to qualified immunity." Id. at 1213-14.

Of particular note is the decision of this court in Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83 (D.C.Cir.1974), holding that the Attorney General was not entitled absolute immunity for his part in directing the activities of the police in Washington, D.C. during the "May Day" demonstrations in 1971.1

Anticipating Imbler by two years, Judge Leventhal wrote for the court that:

In arguing for absolute immunity, the defendants stress the particular duties of the Attorney General, especially his broad supervisory responsibilities over much of the Federal criminal justice system. The Attorney General is on occasion referred to as the nation's "chief prosecutor" as a kind of journalistic shorthand. However, the absolute immunity often accorded prosecuting attorneys cannot shield the defendants in this case, for the prosecutor's absolute protection, like that of the judge from which it is derived, is both justified and bounded by the judicial traditions and procedures that limit and contain the danger of abuse.

(S)uch an extension of judicial immunity would not encompass the executive action complained of here the making of decisions establishing policy as to clearing streets, making arrests, and confining those detained for no comparable safeguards accompany them. 506 F.2d at 93-94 (footnotes omitted).

Following Imbler, this court once again ruled, in Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10 (D.C.Cir.1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904, 98 S.Ct. 3089, 57 L.Ed.2d 1133 (1978), that a prosecutor who was not involved in a prosecutorial/advocacy role was not shielded by absolute immunity. The court in Briggs recognized that absolute immunity extends only so far as necessary to protect a prosecutor's decision with respect to the initiation and conduct of particular cases. Imbler does not, in our reading, immunize prosecutors for any and all measures they may undertake in the course of wide-ranging law enforcement investigations or general fact-finding expeditions. 569 F.2d at 19-20. See also Tigue v. Swaim, 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498 F.2d 1249 (1st Cir. 1974); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 917, 94 S.Ct. 1413, 39 L.Ed.2d 471 (1974).

16-924. Civil penalties; attorney general; county, city or town attorney

A. Unless another penalty is specifically prescribed in this title, if the filing officer for campaign finance reports designated pursuant to section 16-916, subsection A has reasonable cause to believe that a person is violating any provision of this title, except for violations of chapter 6, article 2, the secretary of state shall notify the attorney general for a violation regarding a statewide office or the legislature, the county officer in charge of elections shall notify the county attorney for that county for a violation regarding a county office or the city or town clerk shall notify the city or town attorney for a violation regarding a city or town office. The attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, may serve on the person an order requiring compliance with that provision. The order shall state with reasonable particularity the nature of the violation and shall require compliance within twenty days from the date of issuance of the order. The alleged violator has twenty days from the date of issuance of the order to request a hearing pursuant to title 41, chapter 6.

B. If a person fails to take corrective action within the time specified in the compliance order issued pursuant to subsection A, the attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, shall issue an order assessing a civil penalty of not more than one thousand dollars. The person alleged to have violated the compliance order has thirty days from the date of issuance of the order assessing the civil penalty to request a hearing pursuant to title 41, chapter 6.

C. Any party aggrieved by an order or decision of the attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, may appeal to the superior court as provided in title 12, chapter 7, article 6.

D. For the purposes of this section, failure to comply with a compliance order issued by the attorney general, county attorney or city or town attorney, as appropriate, as prescribed in subsection A is deemed an intentional act.